The Economics of Testing for Biotech Grain: Application to StarLink Corn by Johnson, D. Demcey & Lin, William W.
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 30(2):268-284 
Copyright 2005 Western Agricultural Economics Association 
The Economics of Testing 
for Biotech Grain: 
Application to StarLink Corn 
Demcey  Johnson and  William Lin 
StarLink corn, a variety not approved for human use, disrupted the marketing 
system in 2000 because of inadvertent commingling. This paper provides an  overview 
of the economics of testing grain for biotech content. What are  the risks facing buyers 
and sellers, and how are these influenced by  testing protocols? How  do market 
premiums and discounts, testing costs, and prior beliefs affect the incentives to test? 
A conceptual model is developed in which sellers choose whether to pre-test grain 
prior to shipment. Through simulation analysis, we illustrate the impact of market 
premiums and other variables on testing incentives and buyer risk. 
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Introduction 
The emergence of markets for non-biotech grains has created demand for grain testing 
and stimulated development of new testing methods. Buyers who wish to avoid biotech 
grain can make use of commercially available diagnostic tests. These allow detection of 
specified transgenic events (DNA or protein) in grain samples with levels of  accuracy 
that  have been verified by USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Adminis- 
tration (GIPSA).  While statistical aspects of grain testing have been examined previously 
(see, e.g., Remund et al., 2001), there is relatively little literature on the economic 
incentives and risks associated with testing for biotech content.'  This study places 
testing within an economic context. What is the economic value of information gained 
through testing? What are the tradeoffs between testing costs, accuracy, and risks to 
buyers and sellers? How are risks affected by testing protocols, market premiums and 
discounts, and agents' beliefs about the true concentration of  biotech content? The 
conceptual model is applied to testing for StarLink corn, a biotech variety not approved 
for food use that became inadvertently commingled with other corn supplies in 2000, 
leading to product recalls and the disruption of U.S. corn exports.' 
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The paper begins with a review of  statistical concepts and a summary of  recent test 
results for StarLink.  We then discuss testing within a Bayesian framework, and present 
a conceptual model in which sellers can make a strategic choice about whether to test 
grain prior to shipment. Incentives  for testing and implications for buyer risks are  inves- 
tigated in a simulation exercise. The paper concludes with a short discussion of results. 
Testing for Presence of Biotech Kernels 
In the following discussion, we assume that the buyer's acceptance of  a shipment is 
contingent on a test indicating zero (or a very low concentration of) biotech kernels. 
Tests for the presence of biotech kernels involve the binomial di~tribution.~  Let n denote 
the number of  kernels in a random sample, and let g denote the true concentration of 
biotech kernels (in a grain lot from which the sample is drawn).  The probability of exactly 
"x" biotech kernels in a random sample is designated by: 
b(x; n,g) = (:)gx(l  -gin-'  (pdf of  binomial distribution). 
The probability of no more than "x" biotech kernels in a random sample is given by: 
x 
(2)  B(x; n,g) = x  b(k; n,g)  (binomial cdf). 
k=O 
Aqualitative testthe  type most often used by grain traders-stablishes  the presence 
or absence of biotech kernels. (Quantitative tests, which estimate the proportion of bio- 
tech kernels in a sample, are much more costly and time consuming.) For a qualitative 
test, x = 0 and the chance of  acceptance is B(0; n,g). The chance that grain will be 
rejected due to presence of biotech kernels is 1  -  B(0; n,g). Figure 1  shows the relationship 
between chance of  acceptance and sample size based on a single sample plan. 
A single large sample serves the buyer's interest well if the buyer is willing to accept 
a low concentration of biotech kernels, but not a high concentration. However, under a 
single sample plan, the risk of rejecting lots that are actually acceptable is greater for 
the seller with a larger sample size. Decreasing the sample size would lower this risk. 
Hence, increasing the sample size in a single qualitative test may not serve the best 
interests of  both the buyer and the seller. 
An alternative is to implement a multiple sample plan. Suppose there are  m indepen- 
dent samples, each with n kernels. The buyer agrees to accept the grain if there are no 
more than r positive test results (0 s r < m). In this case, the probability of acceptance 
is: 
r 
(3)  B(r; m, q) = x  b(k; m, q), 
k=O 
where q is the probability of  rejecting one sample, 
Our discussion is focused on sampling error. However, as noted in the USDAlGIPSA (2000)  web briefing, "Sampling for 
the Detection of Biotech Grain," there are other potential sources of measurement error, including sample preparation and 
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.9 1 S.  Sample Size  I 
0.0%  0.5%  1  .O%  1.5%  2.0%  2.5%  3.0% 
Concentration in Lot 
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Figure 2. Probability of acceptance under multiple sample 
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Application to StarLink 
For export shipments to Japan, the official testing protocol for StarLink (developed by 
USDAIGIPSA in consultation with Japanese authorities in November 2000) involves 
three corn subsamples (m = 3) of 800 kernels each. This plan is based on sampling and 
testing recommendations of GIPSA and the Food and Drug Administration, but it also 
reflects the limitations of production and handling processes and current testing tech- 
nology. At present, the detection sensitivity reaches 0.125% (1  StarLink kernel in 800) 
for most test kits. 
Figure 2 shows the chance of accepting grain for alternate values of r. Setting r = 0 
allows none of the three samples to indicate presence of StarLink. Less stringent require- 
ments (r  = 1, or r = 2) expose the buyer to more risk, as shown in table 1. When no 
positive results are allowed (r  = O), the buyer has 99% confidence that the actual 
StarLink concentration (g)  does not exceed 0. 19%.4  Put another way, the  chance that  the 
concentration exceeds 0.19% is no more than 1%. For a chosen confidence level, the 
maximum concentration rises as the requirement becomes less stringent. When r = 3, 
the  maximum concentration jumps to 100%.  When all three samples are  allowed to test 
positive, no direct inference can be made about the concentration of StarLink. This is 
because the probability of rejection is zero regardless of the concentration level. 
These calculations require no prior information about the distribution of StarLink in 
corn being tested. For a chosen confidence level, the maximum concentration level 
provides a worst-case assessment of buyer risk. The maximum concentration level may 
be substantially higher than the expected concentration of  StarLink kernels, given 
available inforiation from actual test results. To illustrate this distinction, we use 
information presented in table 2 to derive an estimate of  the mean StarLink level in 
corn tested over the period January 12, 2003 through January 10, 2004. The overall 
probability of  a sample testing positive was 
total number of positives - 138 * (1)  + 40 * (2) + 61  * (3) = 0.007437  (5)  q  = 
total number of  samples  17,973 
The value ofg  that solves5 
provides an estimate of the underlying concentration of  StarLink kernels. Using this 
procedure, we estimate the concentration at about 0.00093% in the corn tested. This is 
substantially less than concentration levels reported in table 1, which reflect no prior 
information about the distribution of  StarLink. For perspective, estimated StarLink 
concentration levels were about 10-fold higher in the 2000 crop year, based on GIPSA 
test results (Freese, 2004).6 
'  For the 99%  confidence level, the maximum concentration is the value ofg that solves B(r; m, q) = 0.01, where q is the 
probability of rejection for an individual sample, q = 1  -B(O; n,g). This may be represented graphically  in figure 2 by drawing 
a horizontal line at  prob = 0.01; the maximum concentration is determined by the intersection of this line with an  acceptance 
curve. 
This can be done using SOLVER in an  Excel spreadsheet. 
It  should be emphasized that samples submitted to GIPSAfor  StarLink testingare not from randomly selected  lots. Tests 
are conducted at the request of  the applicant. 272  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Maximum  StarLink Concentrations Based on n = 800 and m  = 3 
r: Allowed Number of  Maximum Concentration (%), by Confidence Level 
Positive Test Results  99% Confidence  90% Confidence  50% Confidence 
Table 2. Frequency of Test Results During  January 12, 
2003 and January 10,2004 
Number of Subsamples  Number  Share 
Testing Positive (out of  3)  of Tests  of Total % 
0  17,734  98.670 
1  138  0.768 
2  40  0.223 
3  61  0.339 
Total:  17,973  100.000 
Source: Robert Lijewski, USDAIGIPSA (2004). 
Notes: Table data are based on the testing protocol for StarLink in export shipments 
(m  = 3, n = 800). Test results reported by the Federal Grain Inspection Service and 
official agencies. 
Risks to Buyers and Sellers: A Bayesian Perspective 
As outlined above, the chance of accepting a shipment of grain is conditional on g, the 
proportion of biotech (or StarLink)  kernels in the population from which the sample is 
drawn. We  now consider a situation in which g is unknown, but buyers or sellers of 
grain  have prior beliefs that  can be represented by probability distributions. Beliefs may 
be modified (updated) on the basis of test results. 
Assume that a buyer has a tolerance level for presence of biotech kernels (which may 
be arbitrarily close to zero), and that grain is tested before purchase. Based on the test 
result, the grain will be either accepted or rejected by the buyer. The seller does not have 
perfect information about the content of biotech kernels, but can assign probabilities to 
a grain shipment having high or low levels (relative to the buyer's tolerance). Let P(H) 
denote the  (subjective) probability of a high level, and P(L)  the probability of a low level. 
Probabilities that the  buyer's test will indicate "accept" or "reject" are  denoted P(A) and 
P(R), respectively. Outcomes can be represented as follows: 
Test Result 
Accept (A)  Reject (R)  Marginal 
Biotech  Low (L)  P(L,  A)  P(L,  R) 
Concentration  High  (H)  P(H,  A)  P(H,  R) 
Marginal  P(A)  P(R)  1.0 Johnson and Lin  The Economics of Testing  for Biotech Grains  273 
Joint probabilities are shown within the box. For example,  P(L,  A) is the  joint probability 
of a low concentration and acceptance, and P(L,  R) is the  joint probability of low concen- 
tration and rejection. Marginal probabilities sum to one, and joint probabilities sum to 
marginal probabilities. 
Conditional probabilities are defined via Bayes' rule. For example, the conditional 
probability of H, given A, is denoted by: 
This represents the buyer's risk-the  risk that grain has a high concentration of biotech 
content despite a favorable test result. Seller's risk can be interpreted in different ways. 
From the seller's perspective, risk could be represented by P(R), the probability of  a 
rejected shipment (irrespective of  the actual concentration), particularly if costs are 
incurred as a result of  the rejection. Another interpretation7  views seller's risk as the 
conditional probability of  rejection given low concentration: 
In that case, the test has led to the wrong conclusion, e.g., because of  sampling error. 
Buyer and seller risk (in either form) will reflect the testing protocol, the buyer's 
tolerance, and prior beliefs about the distribution of  biotech kernels. 
Testing and the Value of  Information 
From the buyer's perspective, the value of  information gained from a test could be 
represented by: 
where Kis the (possibly subjective)  unit value of  avoiding high levels of biotech kernels, 
and the expression in brackets is the reduction in buyer risk associated with testing. If 
the value of information exceeds the unit cost of the test, then testing prior to purchase 
makes economic sense for the buyer. 
Now consider the incentives for sellers. Under what conditions will sellers test grain 
for biotech content? To explore this question, we construct an example in which market 
premiums and discounts play a role, along with testing costs. Assume that a seller can 
deliver grain to one of  two markets. The first is a premium market (where sales are 
conditional on test results), and the second is a reserve market (where tests are not 
conducted). Grain shipped to the premium market is tested by the buyer. If biotech 
kernels are not detected, the buyer accepts the grain and the seller earns a premium, 
Y ($/mt). If the grain is rejected due to biotech content, it must be re-routed to another 
location where it incurs a known discount, D.'  Alternatively, the seller could avoid 
This is  the interpretation  given by USDNGIPSA (2000)  in its web briehg,  "Sampling  for the Detection of Biotech Grains" 
(p. 7). 
This is a simplification. In international trade, rejection by one importer may lead to alternate options for the seller: a 
discount negotiatedwith the original  buyer, possibly with labeling requirements;  arranging a sale to another  company at the 
same poe  or re-routing  to another port with additional shipping costs. Thus, discounts may be uncertain. 274  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 3. Seller's problem as a decision tree 
testing by bypassing the premium market and shipping directly to alternate buyers, 
where the grain earns a reserve price, 2. Before deciding where to ship the grain, the 
seller could conduct hisher own test, at  cost T ($/mt),  to gain information about odds of 
buyer acceptance in the premium market. Figure 3 provides a decision tree of the seller's 
problem, with chance nodes represented by circles and decision nodes by squares. 
For plausible parameter values there are  three seller strategies  to c~nsider.~  Strategy 
S1  is to ship directly to the premium market without pre-testing. Strategy S2 is to 
bypass the premium market and ship to the reserve market. Strategy S3 involves a test 
prior to shipping, for which the seller incurs a testing cost. If the result is favorable 
(indicatingno  biotech content, or "accept"),  the grain is shipped to the premium market; 
otherwise it is shipped to the reserve market. Under S3, the probability of  acceptance 
in the premium market is P(AB  I AS). That is, the probability of  buyer acceptance is 
conditioned by the first test result (known to the seller only). Expected payoffs for the 
three seller strategies are presented in table 3. 
Also shown in table 3 is the buyer risk in the premium market. (This is not applicable 
when the premium market is bypassed, as in S2.) The buyer's risk is actually lower 
under S3, i.e., 
'We  assume Y > 2,  etc. In the tree diagram (figure 31, dominated strategies are indicated by double backslashes (\\  1.  For 
example, it would make no sense for the seller to test grain and, if the test result were favorable, ship to the reserve market 
where price is lower. Johnson and Lin  The Economics of Testing  for Biotech Grains  275 
Table 3. Expected Payoffs and Buyer Risks Under Different Strategies 
Seller Strategy  Seller's Expected Payoff  Buyer Risk 
S1  PUB)  *Y -  P(RB)  *D  P(H  I  A,) 
S2  Z  Not Applicable 
Definitions: 
S1 =  Seller ships grain to premium market without pre-testing 
S2  =  Seller ships grain to reserve market where testing is not required 
S3  =  Seller tests grain before deciding where to ship 
As  =  "Acceptn  indicated by seller's test prior to shipment 
A,  =  "Acceptn  indicated by buyer's test upon delivery to premium market 
Rs  =  "Rejectn  indicated by seller's test prior to shipment 
RB =  '=ejectn indicated by buyer's test upon delivery to premium market 
Y  =  Premium for grain accepted in premium market ($/mt) 
D  =  Discount applied if grain is rejected in premium market ($/mt) 
Z  =  Price received in reserve market where grain is not tested ($/mt) 
T  =  Testing cost incurred by seller for pre-test ($/mt) 
because under this strategy the grain has been tested twice and probabilities of 'tigh" 
levels of biotech kernels are reduced accordingly. This hinges on our assumption that 
parameters of the underlying probability distribution are  not known with certainty, so 
that successive test results can lead to revision of (subjective) risk assessments. 
Pre-testing by the seller (S3) works to the advantage of the buyer in the premium 
market by lowering risk. However, the seller's optimal strategy depends on multiple 
factors, including the  premium offered by the buyer (Y),  the discount if grain is rejected 
(D),  the reservation price (Z),  and the testing cost (T)  and testing protocol. Pre-testing 
is not always optimal from the seller's perspective. 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how the premium (Y) could affect seller payoffs, holding 
other parameters fured. In each figure, crossover points are marked where returns are 
equalized across strategies. Thus, payoffs for strategies S1  and S2 are equalized at 
Y = b, payoffs for S1  and S3  are equalized at  Y  =  a,  and payoffs for S2 and S3  are equalized 
at  Y = c. Slopes are given by the derivative of the seller's expected payoff (table 3) with 
respect to Y.  The payoff for S2 is independent of the premium, and hence has zero slope. 
Buyer risks are also represented in figures 4 and 5. When S1  is the dominant strategy 
(lying above S2 and S3), the buyer's risk is higher, as discussed earlier. 
In  figure 4 there is a range of premiums (c 2 Y  2 a)  for which strategy S3  (pre-testing) 
is optimal. Below that  range, strategy S2 is optimal, and above it strategy S1  is optimal. 
When the premium is too low (Y < c), the seller bypasses the premium market. When 
it is too high (a < Y), the seller maximizes expected return by shipping to the premium 
market  without pre-testing.''  Figure 5 illustrates a different situation--one  in which no 
"This follows from the specification  of the seller's problem. Note that in figure 4, the line for S1  is more steeply sloped than 
that for S3. Slopes are given by an:,/aY = PUB)  for S1, and an:,laY = PU,)PU,  I  A,)  = P&,  A,)  for S3, where n: denotes the 
seller's expected payoff. Since PUB)  =PUS,  A,)  + P(R,,A,)  and all probabilities are positive, it is certain that ax,laY = P01,) 
> Pa,, A,)  = an:,lay. The implication is that, for sufficiently high premiums (greater than "an  in figure 4), holding other 
parameters fixed,  S1  will have a higher expected payoff thanS3. Another explanation  may be more intuitive.  Under strategy 
S1, the seller attaches probability PUB)  to grain earning a premium. Under strategy S3, a smaller probability, PUS,  A,), 
applies. The difference is P(R,,A,):  the probability that test results might contlict in a way favorable to the seller's interest. 
By  pursuing S1, the seller avoids diverting grain (based on a pre-test)  the buyer would accept. 276  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Premium 
Figure 4. Seller returns as function of premium, version 1 
Figure 5. Seller returns as function of premium, version 2 Johnson and Lin  The Economics of Testing  for Biotech Grains  277 
premium can induce pre-testing by the seller. This would occur if testing costs were 
prohibitively high, for example. Note that crossover points are now in a different order 
(a < b < c), relative to figure 4. 
Seller strategies carry different implications for buyer risks. However, the buyer and 
seller do not share the same information. They may have different prior beliefs about 
the distribution of biotech kernels, and results from the seller's own tests (prior to ship- 
ment) are private information. There are aspects of a principal-agent problem in this 
situation. The principal (buyer) cannot observe whether the agent (seller) has tested 
grain prior to shipment, and hence does not have equally good information about the 
risk of high concentration. The buyer influences the incentives for pre-testing through 
the choice of premium (and testing protocol), but must consider two factors. If'the buyer's 
premium is too low, the seller will be driven to an alternative market (participation 
constraint). If the premium is too high, the seller will participate without pre-testing, 
exposing the buyer to higher risk (incentive compatibility constraint).''  In the next 
section, the tradeoff between participation and buyer risk will be explored in a simu- 
lation analysis. 
Testing for Starlink A Simulation Analysis 
The following analysis uses simulation to represent a universe of potential grain sellers, 
each with different prior information and opportunity costs. The likely concentration of 
StarLink kernels (as perceived by potential sellers) is represented by a Weibull distri- 
bution.12  This distribution is  characterized by two parameters: P, the shape parameter, 
and 0, the scale parameter. Choosing p = 0.4 and 0 = 3 x104 produces a distribution that 
is broadly consistent with StarLink test results for the January 12,2003  January  10, 
2004 period.13  However, in the simulation presented here, we consider a range of values 
for the scale parameter. This is meant to reflect differences in  the  prior beliefs of sellers, 
with smaller values of 8 representing more refined information about the  concentration 
of StarLink in  grain available for sale. In  the simulation, 500 values of 0 are  drawn from 
a uniform distribution,14 8 -  UNIF(3 xlo4, 3 x10"). 
Sellers may also differ in terms of their reservation price (opportunity cost). It seems 
plausible that sellers with more refined information (lower value of  0) would have a 
higher reservation price-e.g., to ensure  recovery of higher costs associated with quality 
management. For this reason, we assume Z, the seller's reservation price, is a random 
variable that is negatively correlated with 0. For convenience, we assume Z has a 
uniform distribution,  Z -  UNIF(0,lO). The assumed correlation coefficient is -0.5. Other 
l1 See Gardner (1995, pp. 271-298)  for discussion of principal-agent problems using game theory. 
l2 The Weibull distribution was chosen for illustrative purposes. It can assume a variety of shapes and is bound below by 
zero. As noted by Bain and Engelhardt (1992, pp. 116-1171, its probability density function (pdf) has the form: 
with p > 0 and 8  > 0; and its cumulative distribution function (cdf) is given by: 
F(x; 0, p)  = 1  -  e-'~/~)',  x > 0. 
13 These parameter values were chosen to  be consistent with an  expected concentration level ofE(x) = 0.001%. The implied 
cumulative probability of StarLink concentrations less than 0.01% is 0.983, which is reasonably close to the percentage of 
samples testing negative for StarLink over the January 2003-January  2004 period (table 2). 
l4 The choice of uniform distribution is ad hoc. As noted by a reviewer, a plausible alternative assumption is that this distri- 
bution is bimodal, with one group possessing refined information and another having diffuse priors. 278  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
parameters are fmed. They include T, the unit testing cost ($/mt), and D, the unit cost 
associated with rejected shipments ($/mt). Initially we assume T = 0 and D = $25. The 
buyer is  assumed to apply the standard testing procedure for export shipments (3  samples 
of 800 kernels  each), and the  threshold between "low" and  "high"concentrations is  O.OI%.~~ 
The simulation is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet using @Risk software. For 
each drawing of the random variables (8, Z), the spreadsheet calculates the range of 
buyer premiums that would support different seller strategies, as illustrated in figures 
4 and 5.16 Risks to buyers are also calculated based on the seller's prior information and 
(when applicable) test results.17 
Simulation  results are  summarized in figures 6-8. Each figure shows results for three 
different testing protocols, of which "AO"  is the most stringent (allowing none of  the 
three test samples to be positive for StarLink),  and "A2" the least (allowing two samples 
to test positive). Figure 6 shows how the number of sellers varies with the size of  the 
premium." For each testing  protocol, higher premiums induce a larger share  ofpotential 
sellers to ship to the  premium market where testing is  required. For the  most stringent 
protocol, a $10 premium attracts about 40% of potential sellers; participation rates are 
substantially  higher for less stringent protocols. Participation is  complete (100%)  for all 
protocols when the premium reaches $20." 
Of the sellers who ship to the premium market, not all choose to test grain prior to 
shipment. As shown by figure 7, the share of  sellers who pre-test is highest under the 
most stringent testing protocol. The share of  sellers who pre-test declines with higher 
premium levels, so that  under all protocols there is  insufficient incentive for pre-testing 
when the  premium reaches $25. The decline in pre-testing  is  not intuitively obvious,  but 
is consistent with earlier indications (table 3, figures 4 and 5) that a non-pre-testing 
strategy will come to dominate at higher premium levels. 
Figure 8 shows the  combined impact of seller participation rates and testing decisions 
on buyer risk. In principle, higher premiums (over a given range) can lead to higher or 
lower levels of buyer risk, depending on the relative importance of these factors. Under 
the most stringent protocol (AO), average buyer risks increase with the premium. 
However, under the least stringent  protocol (A2),  buyer risk falls slightly (for premiums 
between $5 and $10) before stabilizing. This modest decline in buyer risk is due to 
expanded participation of sellers. 
l5 This is equivalent to 1  kernel in 10,000, which is the limit of detection for currently approved test kits. 
'' For each realization, this entails calculation of the crossover points (premiums) at which expected seller payoffs are 
equalized. If c < b < a (as  in figure 4), strategy S2 dominates for premiums less than  c; S3  dominates for premiums between 
c and b; and S1  dominates for premiums greater than a. Buyer risks also differ in these ranges. If a < b < c (as in figure 5), 
strategy S2  dominates for premiums less than  b; strategyS1 dominates for premiums greater than  b; and strategy S3  is  never 
optimal. 
"Conditional  probabilities are calculated with discrete approximations. For example, the chance of acceptance given "low" 
levels of StarLink (relative to buyer's tolerance) is given by: 
where q = 1  -  B(0; 800,  j*h). In  this calculation, the range of "low" concentration is  divided into k equal increments of length 
h, and c is a lower bound arbitrarily close to zero (e.g., c = 0.00001). F(  j)  is the Weibull cdf. Calculations of P(A I  H)  are 
similar. Given conditional probabilities, other relevant probabilities are derived via Bayes' rule and adding-up properties. 
IS In figure 6, "participation rate" represents the share of sellers who sell to the premium market. 
19 Actual premiums paid by buyers for StarLink-free corn might differ, depending on end use. For food-use corn, Japanese 
buyers presently are willing to pay $8 to $10 per metric ton premium for non-biotech corn that is produced, handled, and 
distributed under identity preservation to avoid potential StarLink commingling. This premium level does not apply to feed- 
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Figure 6. Impact of premium on rate of seller participation 
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Figure 7. Impact of premium on testing by sellers prior 
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Figure 8. Impact of premium on risks to buyers 
A More Accurate Test for  StarLink: 
Impact of Lot Size and Testing Cost 
For comparison,  a simulation was conducted using a different testing protocol--one based 
on a single sample of 10,000  kernels. This represents the most sensitive of commercially 
available tests for StarLink. Previously, we assumed testing costs were zero, which is 
in line with the use of the lateral flow strip test, a protein-based method that is stipu- 
lated in the U.S. and Japan StarLink testing protocol. The more sensitive micro-titer 
well test kit can detect 1  StarLink kernel in 10,000, but this testing procedure costs 
more and takes 2-4 hours to complete. The retail cost is around $195 to $200, and the 
cost charged by private laboratories varies from $35 to $100 per test. A more typical 
range is between $45 and $75 per test (Kendall, 2004). 
The size of the  corn lot also affects the per-unit cost. Typical lot size varies from about 
800 bushels (20.3 metric tons) for a truckload, to 3,570 bushels (100 short tons) for a 
hopper car, and 50,000-55,000 bushels (1,330 metric tons) for a barge. Thus, test cost 
per metric ton ranges from $3.33 for truck to $0.74 for hopper car and $0.05 for barge. 
Simulation results are shown in figures 9-11.  Impacts of the premium on the share 
of sellers who ship to the premium market, share of sellers who test prior to shipment, 
and buyer risk vary by lot size. Sellers have little or no incentive to ship to the  premium 
market when the premium falls below $20 per metric ton (figure 9). Participation rises 
as  the premium exceeds $20/mt, but varies by lot size. The rate of participation is highest 
for barge-size lots, as the test cost is spread over a much larger grain volume. Partici- 
pation is lowest when testing is done by truckload. 
Sellers find little incentive to pre-test for the presence of StarLink corn in their ship- 
ments if the buyer's premium falls below $15 per metric ton, given positive testing costs 
(figure 10).  However, there is interest in pre-testing for barge and  hopper car shipments 
if the premium exceeds $15 or $20 per metric ton. The hike is  particularly stiff for barge Johnson and Lin  fie Economics of Testing  for Biotech Grains  28 1 
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Figure 11. Impact of premium on buyer risk by lot size 
shipment-over  90% of  the sellers pre-test for the presence of  StarLink when the 
premium exceeds $20/mt. Sellers have no incentive to pre-test for truck shipment even 
when the premium reaches $30/mt, due to high per-unit testing costs. 
Buyer risk is inversely related to the share of  sellers who pre-test for the presence of 
StarLink kernels, for reasons indicated earlier [equation (lo)].  Relationships between 
premiums and buyer risk (by lot size) are shown in figure 11. In the case of  truck 
shipments, higher per-unit testing costs discourage the sellers from pre-testing. In that 
case, the positive relationship between the premium and buyer risk is due entirely to 
participation effects. For hopper car and barge shipments, changes in buyer risk (at 
higher premium levels) are due to a combination of participation effects and changes in 
sellers' testing strategies. In general, barge shipments expose the buyer to the lowest 
risk of  high StarLink concentration. 
Concluding Remarks 
Tests for the presence of  biotech grain expose buyers and sellers to new risks. In 
combination with premiums and discounts, these risks can be an important aspect of 
procurement and marketing decisions. Buyers who wish to exclude biotech grains can 
influence their risk through their choice of testing protocol (e.g., sample size, single vs. 
multiple sample plans). Buyer risk is also influenced by the size of  the price premium 
offered for non-biotech purchases. Higher premiums can actually add to buyer risk, 
either because of participation effects (adverse  selection of sellers) or because of reduced 
incentives for seller pre-testing. Risks facing sellers must be viewed in the context of 
marketing alternatives. Incentives for sellers to test grain prior to shipment depend on 
a number of factors: applicable premiums and discounts, testing costs, and prior beliefs 
about the concentration of  biotech kernels. Johnson and Lin  The Economics of Testing  for Biotech Grains  283 
Simulation analysis provides a flexible means for investigating these effects-partic- 
ularly when there is uncertainty about underlying distributions. In our experiments, 
simulation was used to represent a universe of  potential sellers, each with different 
prior beliefs and opportunity costs. Ceteris paribus, sellers with more refined informa- 
tion about the "true" concentration of biotech kernels have less incentive to test grain 
prior to shipment. Pre-testing is more advantageous when priors are diffuse. 
Estimated concentrations of StarLink in tested corn (based on results collected by 
official agencies) are now substantially lower than in 2000, when contamination of 
processed foods was first reported. However, testing protocols remain in effect for 
export shipments to Japan, and some domestic manufacturers maintain more strin- 
gent tests. Commercial test kits can now promise detection of one StarLink kernel 
in 10,000, but at  a cost that limits their appeal for bulk grain handlers. This points 
to the inherent difficulty of satisfying a "zero-tolerancen  standard for unapproved bio- 
tech events. 
An  emerging issue  is  whether, and under what conditions, the  interests ofbuyers and 
sellers are well served by a reliance on testing. An alternative approach involves 
identification and certification of  suppliers who meet stringent quality-assurance 
criteria:  when buyers have high confidence in a supplier, extensive testing  (with  its  costs 
and risks) may be obviated. The Process Verification Program (PVP) now offered by 
GIPSA is intended to facilitate marketing of value-enhanced commodities, including 
non-biotech grains, by providing independent, third-party verification that suppliers 
meet internationally recognized standards for quality management. Simulation 
analysis, like that  presented here, could provide insights into the  expected payoffs from 
participating in such programs. 
Some limitations of the analysis should be mentioned. Although we alluded to some 
agency aspects, the analysis falls short of a fully integrated model of buyer-seller inter- 
actions. To extend it in the direction of  a principal-agent model would require formal 
specification of the buyer's objectives and constraints. Currently, the analysis does not 
make explicit  assumptions about the buyer's  risk aversion.20  A risk-averse utility 
function (or the inclusion of chance constraintsz1  in a cost-minimization problem) might 
provide some of the necessary structure. The analysis presents a rather simplified view 
of the seller's decision environment, ignoring the temporal nature of the grain market, 
the importance of repeat business, and the reputation effects that might be associated 
with rejected shipments. Incorporating these factors would surely require a multi-period 
model (e.g., dynamic games). Finally, we have not captured the complexity of grain 
procurement, storage, and shippinglogistics+r  the  diverse ways in which biotech grain 
can be introduced into a product stream through adventitious commingling. 
[Received August 2004;Jinal revision received May 2005.1 
20 However, we assume the seller to be riskneutral-i.e.,  model results are driven by the seller's maximization of expected 
profit. 
See Wilson and Preszler (1992)  for an application of chance-constrained  programming to  an importer's wheat purchase 
decision. Journal ofAgricultura1  and Resource Economics 
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